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NOTES
REVERSE FOIA SUITS AFTER CHRYSLER: A NEW DIRECTION
INTRODUCTION

In an effort to promote open government and curb abuses of power caused
by government secrecy, in 1966 Congress passed the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA).1 A culmination of a ten year congressional effort,2 the FOIA was
enacted to amend section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
(APA), 3 which had proved totally inadequate as a disclosure mechanism due4
to vague drafting and a grant of excessive discretion to government agencies.
The purpose of the FOIA is to "establish a general philosophy of full agency
disclosure . . . and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the
press may obtain information wrongfully withheld." s To achieve this purpose
the FOIA mandates the disclosure of a wide range of information which is on
file with government agencies 6 and gives federal district courts jurisdiction to
conduct a de novo review when it is alleged that an agency has refused to
comply with a request to release information. 7
At the same time, Congress recognized the need to insure the confidentiality
of certain information and to protect the privacy rights of submitters. 8 The
FOIA, therefore, specifically exempts nine categories of information 9 from its
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976); see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. CL 1705, 1709 (1979).
2. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 762 (1967);
Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 895, 897
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Assessment].
3. Pub. L. No. 404 § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (formerly codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1002); see S. Rep.
No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Senate Report).
4. "Section 3 of the Administrative Procedures Act . . . is full of loopholes which allow
agencies to deny legitimate information to the public." 1965 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3.
5. Id. "The basic purpose of the FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors
accountable to the governed." NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
See generally Note, NLRB Discovery After Robbins: More Peril for Private Litigants, 47
Fordham L. Rev. 393 (1978).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976). The FOIA is only applicable to agencies of the federal
government, as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), which excludes Congress and the courts of the
United States. See Assessment, supra note 2, at 898.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). In a de novo review, the court may examine the documents
involved and any other relevant information. It need not give any deference to an agency's
previous determination. J. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure § 8.04 (1977); Assessment,
supra note 2, at 910-11.
"That the proceeding must be de novo is essential in order that the ultimate decision as to the
propriety of the agency's action is made by the court and prevent it from becoming meaningless
judicial sanctioning of agency discretion." 1965 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 8.
8. 1965 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3.
9. "This section does not apply to matters that are--(1)(A) specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense of
foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order, (2) related
soley to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency- (3) specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires
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broad disclosure mandate in an attempt to balance the public's right to obtain
information with the interests of privacy and confidentiality. 10
Despite the laudable objectives of Congress in enacting the FOIA, it has
often been used by business entities as a device to obtain valuable and
otherwise unavailable information submitted to the government by their
competitors.I' This situation often arises in the case of government contractors.1 2 For example, in order for the government to monitor compliance with
13
Executive Orders prohibiting discrimination in employment practices, government contractors are required to file extensive information concerning
their operations and work forces with various federal agencies.' 4 In the
possession of business competitors, this information could be an invaluable
tool for analysis of the submitter's business and for a comparative evaluation
of each party's operations. 15 The submitter is thus faced with a dilemma. A
refusal to comply with an agency's reporting requirements may result in the
that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the
issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters
to be withheld; (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (6)
personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the Identity
of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a law enforcement authority in
the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E)
disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel; (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision
of financial institutions; or (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
10. 1965 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3.
11. Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1977)
(statement of Burt A. Braverman); Clement, The Rights of Submitters To Prevent Agency
Disclosure of Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom of litformnation Act
Lawsuit, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 587, 588-89 (1977).
12. J. O'Reilly, supra note 7, § 10.09.
13. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11375, 3 C.F.R. 169-77 (1974).
14. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.3, 60-1.7 (1979). These regulations require that government contractors
submit Employer Information Reports and Affirmative Action Programs. These reports contain
"extensive information on staffing patterns, pay scales, actual and expected shifts in employment,
promotions, seniority and related matters as well as forecasts of future employment, goals,
time-tables and future employment projections, promotion and utilization of minorities and
females . . . [and] an analysis of the employer's success in meeting such goals." Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1195 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924
(1977).
15. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171, 176 (D. Del. 1976), vacated and
remanded, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
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forfeiture of a lucrative government contract;
compliance with these require16
ments may cause him competitive harm.
This development has created great alarm among submitters and their
plight has been brought before the courts in litigation attempting to block the
disclosure of confidential information. 17 These suits have become known as
"reverse FOIA suits." Although of fairly recent vintage,' 8 the reverse FOIA
suit has become an extremely confused and complicated area of law. Perhaps
the main reason for this confusion is Congress' failure to explicitly provide for
any such suit in the FOIA. 19 Government contractors and other parties
submitting confidential information to federal agencies have therefore been
forced to search for bases to bar the disclosure of requested information to
their competitors. Numerous approaches have been taken and the circuits
have split on the resolution of the various issues involved in a reverse FOIA
suit. Some direction may be derived from the recent Supreme Court decision
in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 20 but many questions still remain.
16.

Note, The Corporate Dilemnma in "Reverse" FOlA Suits: Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 40

U. Pitt. L. Rev. 93, 96 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Dilemmna].
17. "Understandably, firms that submit confidential documents to Federal agencies have
expressed concern about their release. While competitively harmful business information may be
withheld under the Freedom of Information Act, other data may legitimately be sought and
publicly released. Business's concern is not merely theoretical-numerous disputes and court
cases have arisen over the release of such information." H.R. Rep. No. 1382, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House Report].
18. The first reverse FOIA suit was in 1973, Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F.
Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
19. See Comment, Reverse-Freedom of Infornation Act Suits: Confidential Information in
Search of Protection, 70 Nw. L. Rev. 995, 996 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reverse Suits].
Although the Act specifically provides for direct FOIA suits, when the requestor seeks to compel
the release of information, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976), no similar provision exists for
reverse FOIA suits.
20. 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979). As a government contractor, Chrysler was required by Executive
Orders not to discriminate in its employment practices. In order to insure compliance with these
Orders, regulations required that Chrysler furnish the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the
designated compliance agency, with Employer Review Reports and Affirmative Action Programs.
These forms contain extensive information relating to the companies' work forces and employment goals. See note 14 supra. In May, 1975, the DLA informed Chrysler that third parties had
made an FOIA request for this information. Although Chrysler objected to the release, the DLA
determined that the materials were subject to disclosure under both the FOIA and relevant
disclosure regulations. 99 S. Ct. at 1710.
The center of controversy in the Chrysler case was a regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs which allowed the disclosure of
information notwithstanding the fact that it fell within an FOIA exemption. 41 C.F.R. §
60-40.2(a) (1979). For the text of this regulation, see note 83 infra. The DLA also notified
Chrysler that it was required by the FOIA to make a substantive decision concerning the release
within 10 working days of the receipt of the request, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)tA)(i) (1976), and
therefore could not withhold disclosure of the documents pending an administrative appeal by
Chrysler. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1179 & n.27 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
In an effort to block the imminent release of the information, Chrysler brought suit. The
district court permanently enjoined the release of a portion of the material. 412 F. Supp. 171 (D.
Del. 1976). On appeal, however, that decision was vacated. 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated and remanded. 99 S. CL 1705 (1979).
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I. BASES FOR REVERSE FOIA SUIT
Due to the lack of any express provision in the FOIA for reverse FOIA suits,
the grounds upon which submitters have attempted to base their claims have
been numerous. 21 By the time of the Chrysler suit, however, three substantive
theories emerged as predominant. 22 Submitters sought relief by suing under the
APA, 23 and by asserting implied causes of action under both the FOIA and
section 1905, the Trade Secrets Act.24 Each theory, however, posed particular
problems for reviewing courts and was the source of much litigation.
A. Implied Cause of Action Under the FOIA
Despite the failure of Congress expressly to provide for reverse FOIA suits,
parties seeking to bar disclosure of information contended that such causes of
action were implied in the statute. 25 The implication was said to derive from the
provision of exemptions from disclosure2 6 which, it was claimed, were mandatory prohibitions against disclosure. Therefore, if an agency released exempted
information it would be violating the FOIA and the right to prevent such
violations was implied in that statute. 27 In a suit based on this theory, submitters
would be entitled to a trial de novo, 28 a procedure which is advantageous to them
21. The Chrysler litigation is an excellent example of the various theories upon which
submitters have sought to bar the release of information requested under the FOIA. In that case,
challenges were raised under the FOIA, the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), the
judicial review section of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-8(e) (1976), and the Federal Reports Act of 1942, 44 U.S.C. §
3508 (1976). Chrysler also raised a due process challenge. See note 22 infra. Although the focus of
this Note is the substantive bases for reverse FOIA suits, problems also exist concerning
jurisdiction. It is now settled that jurisdiction for reverse FOIA suits may be founded upon the
general federal jurisdiction statute. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1725 n.47 (1979);
1978 House Report, supra note 17 at 55-56. Jurisdictional problems do arise, however, in cases of
joinder, indispensible parties, and other more complex litigation. See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 598 F.2d 790, 797-99 (3d Cir. 1979). For an in depth analysis of
these jurisdictional problems see Campbell, Reverse Freedom of Infornation Act Litigation: The
Need for Congressional Action, 67 Geo. L.J. 103, 160-88 (1978).
22. Chrysler raised three arguments before the Supreme Court. First it claimed that disclosure was in violation of the FOIA itself. Second, it asserted that § 1905 barred release of the
materials. Finally, it claimed that disclosure of the dccuments would constitute an abuse of
discretion, in violation of the APA. Chrysler also claimed that the disclosure was unlawful under
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976), and the Federal Reports Act, 44 U.S.C. §
3508 (1976), but these sections were held inapplicable by the circuit court and were not raised
before the Supreme Court. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1725 n.47. Likewise,
Chrysler's claim that it was denied due process of law in the agency proceedings was quickly
dismissed by the district, 412 F. Supp. at 178, and circuit, 565 F.2d at 1193, courts and not
reasserted before the Supreme Court.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
25. Union Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 542 F.2d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 542
F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
26. See note 9 supra.
27. See cases cited note 25 supra.
28. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1215 (4th Cir. 1976) ("The
supplier [of information] is entitled to a fair and adequate hearing, on proper evidence, in the
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because reviewing courts are not limited to the agency record and, furthermore,
can substitute their judgment for that of the agency 29 The majority of courts
have not accepted the theory 30 that a cause of action is implied in the FOIA to bar
agency disclosure. 3' It has been held, instead, that when information falls within
an exemption that information is merely outside the disclosure mandate of the
FOIA and the government agency retains its discretion to decide whether
disclosure is appropriate. Under this theory the exemptions are characterized as
permissive. 32 The Supreme Court in Chrysler has confirmed the majority view
courts, a hearing that is no less broad and adequate than that given the merely curious who may
seek disclosure."); see Note, "Reversing" The Freedom of Information Act: CongressionalIntention or Judicial Invention?, 51 St. John's L. Rev. 734, 737, 743 (1977) thereinafter cited as
Reversing the FOIA].
29. Reversing the FOIA, supra note 28, at 737; see note 7 supra.
30. Originally this theory had received support from some decisions; see cases cited note 25
supra.
31. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated on other
grounds and remanded sub non. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979); General
Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1216 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds and
remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1185 (3d Cir.
1977), vacated on other grounds and remanded sub non. Chrysler v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705
(1979); Superior Oil Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 563 F.2d 191, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1977);
Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 534 F.2d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 1976); Charles River Park
"A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Westchester Gen. Hasp. v. HEW, 464 F
Supp. 236, 239 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Guerra v. Guajardo, 466 F Supp. 1046, 1058 (S.D. Tex. 1978),
aff'd mem., 597 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1979); St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 462 F Supp. 315,
317 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F Supp. 150, 170 (D.D.C. 1976),
cert. denied sub nom. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. National Org. for Women, 431 U.S. 924
(1977). Commentators concur with the majority of courts. Campbell, supra note 21, at 131-35;
Clement, supra note 11, at 597-602; Connolly & Fox, Employer Rights and Access To Documents
Under The Freedom of Information Act, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 203, 223-30 (1977); Corporate
Dilemma, supra note 16, at 99-101; Reverse Suits, supra note 19, at 1009-11.
Although the majority of circuits concurred in this analysis, the matter was not free from
controversy. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted a different view.
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), that court,
reasoned that "when a statute, whether phrased in the form of an exemption or not, grants a
private party protection from disclosure, it carries with it an implied right in the private party to
invoke the equity powers of a court to assure him that protection." Id. at 1211. Accordingly, the
court held an implied cause of action based on the FOIA to be proper.
32. Although there has been a tendency to view all the exemptions as permissive, care must
be taken to avoid an improper application of this interpretation to exemption 3. The permissive
nature of the exemptions cannot render an otherwise mandatory nondisclosure statute permissive.
The following passage clarifies this reasomng- "Some confusion might arise from the permissive
rather than mandatory character of the FOIA exemptions. Since agencies are permitted under the
FOIA to disclose exempt information, arguably they have discretionary authority under exemption three to disclose information 'specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.' This line of
reasoning, however, ignores the obligation of agencies to exercise their discretionary authority
under the permissive exemptions 'to the extent permitted bv other laws,
and since Congress
specified that the FOIA did not modify in any way the statutes restricting agency disclosure,
exemption three clearly is not permssive in the same fashion as the other exemptions. Instead,
the third exemption may be interpreted as permissive only in the technical sense that it provides
no cause of action for submitters in reverse FOIA cases. In cases in which agency release of
information would violate nondisclosure statutes, submitters may rely only upon the applicable
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that no such cause of action exists within the FOIA. 33
B. Actions Under the APA
A second basis for reverse FOIA suits has been the APA. Pursuant to that
statute, "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review

thereof."'34 In an action under the APA, a submitter whose interests would be
adversely affected by a release could challenge an agency's decision to disclose
even if the FOIA's exemptions were construed as permissive.35 The standard of
review in suits brought under this statute, however, is unclear. The APA limits
judicial review so that agency action, findings and conclusions can be set aside
if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law." '36 Normally, an agency has abused its discretion if it
fails to consider the appropriate factors in making its decision or makes a clear
error in judgment. 37 Although the APA provides for de novo review in two
circumstances, neither has been held applicable to reverse FOIA actions. 38
nondisclosure statute or the Administrative Procedure Act for a cause of action to enjoin
disclosure." Clement, supra note 11, at 602 n.60.
33. 99 S. Ct. at 1714. Three factors prompted the Court's determination "[tihat the FOIA is
exclusively a disclosure statute" and that the exemptions are not designed to be "mandatory bars
to disclosure." Id. at 1713. First, the Court looked to the organization of the statute. It recognized
that subsection (a) places a general obligation of disclosure on the agencies while subsection (b)
merely specifies materials which are not subject to this disclosure mandate. Id. at 1712-13. "By its
terms," the Court concluded, "subsection (b) demarcates the limits of the agency's obligation to
disclose; it does not foreclose disclosure." Id. at 1713. Second, the provisions for judicial relief In
the FOIA were examined. While the statute gives federal courts jurisdiction to compel the
disclosure of "improperly withheld" information-a direct FOIA suit-the Court noted that there
is no similar provision to bar attempted disclosure. Id. Finally, the Court reviewed the legislative
history of the FOIA and determined that it also supports the view that the purpose of the
exemptions is to enable agencies to withhold certain materials rather than to forbid their release.
Id. at 1713-14. The enactment of the FOIA, therefore, did not restrict the discretion of an agency
to disclose information; hence, no cause of action was implied under the FOIA. Id. at 1714.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
35. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (8th Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 563 F.2d 1172,
1190-92 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct, 1705
(1979).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976); see Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
37. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). While this
inquiry is to be in depth and carefully done, the final standard of review is narrow. Id.; GTE
Sylvania Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352, 367 (D. Del. 1975). A court
may not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency," Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), and review is generally limited to the agency record, Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F.
Supp. 352, 367 (D. Del. 1975). This drawback has made the APA approach somewhat
unattractive to submitters. Reversing the FOJA, supra note 28, at 737.
38. Section 10(e) of the APA provides that a "reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... unwarranted by the facts to the extent
that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court." 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). The Supreme
Court in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), interpreted the
phrase "unwarranted by the facts" to mean that de novo review of agency action was available only In
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Nevertheless, in these cases, courts have circumvented the APA's strictures, at
times going so far as to conduct a trial de novo. 39 This practice has produced
confusion. The source of much of the controversy is a decision by the District of
Columbia Circuit, Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD,40 in which novel
reasoning was utilized to avoid the narrow review provisions of the APA. The
court reasoned that if the materials did not fall within an FOIA exemption, they
would be subject to mandatory disclosure and plaintiffs would have no right to
challenge their release. Hence, the court concluded that inquiry into whether
the materials fell within one of the FOIA exemptions was not a review of
agency discretion, but "a threshold determination whether the [submitters
had] any cause of action at all." 4 1 Therefore, instead of applying the APA's
limited standard of review to this question, the court remanded, instructing
the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing "to determine whether the
information involved here would have been exempt just as it would if a suit
had been brought under the FOIA to compel disclosure. '4"2 In a suit brought
to compel disclosure-a direct FOIA suit-the proper standard of review is a
trial de novo. 43 In effect, therefore, the instruction above directed de novo
review.
This result has been severely criticized by those who assert that due to the
permissive nature of the exemptions, even this threshold determination constitutes a review of agency discretion." Despite criticism
the Charles River Park
45
rationale has been followed by some courts.
two circumstances: first, "when the action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding
procedures are inadequate." Id. at 415. Second, "when issues that were not before the agency are
raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action." Id. Neither of these circumstances
has been held applicable to reverse FOIA suits. Regarding the first circumstance, submitters have
generally been unable to show inadequacies in agency factfinding procedures. Clement, supra note
11, at 629. Although inadequacies exist, they usually arise out of a failure of the agency to fully
develop the record to support its decision. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1192 (3d
Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub noma.Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979);
Campbell, supra note 21, at 137. As for the second circumstance, reverse FOIA actions are
adjudicatory in nature and they are not proceedings to enforce. Campbell, supra note 21, at 137; see
GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352, 367 n.65 (D.Del. 1975).
39. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1976), vacated and remanded, S65
F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remandedsub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S.Ct. 1705
(1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977);
;Sonderegger v. United States Dep't of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 847 (D. Idaho 1976); 1978 House
-Report, supra note 17, at 59.
40. 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In that case plaintiffs were required to submit financial reports
to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), in connection with certain mortgages. When plaintiffs learned that HUD had
decided to comply with an FOIA request for disclosure of these reports they filed a reverse FOIA suit
based on the APA. Id. at 938-39.
41. Id. at 940 n.4.
42. Id.
43. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
44. Campbell, supra note 21, at 140; Clement, supra note 11, at 631 n.206.
45. Sondregger v. United States Dep't of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 847, 848 (D.Idaho 1976); see
Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171 (D.Del. 1976), vacated and remanded, 565 F 2d
1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remandedsub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979);
1978 House Report, supra note 17, at 59. In another decision by the District of Columbia Circuit,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977), the APA
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C. Actions Under the Trade Secrets Act
Parties attempting to bar disclosure of information submitted to federal agen46
cies have also attempted to base reverse FOIA suits on non-disclosure statutes.
Under this approach, the submitters claimed that even if the FOIA permitted
disclosure, other statutes barred the release. The statute relied upon in the vast
majority of cases is 18 U.S.C. § 1905, the Trade Secrets Act, 47 which imposes
criminal sanctions on government employees who release trade secrets or
other confidential business information unless such disclosure is "authorized
by law."'48 The relation between section 1905 and the FOIA, particularly in
reverse FOIA litigation, has been a fertile source of controversy. Dispute
developed concerning not only the appropriate procedure for raising a section
1905 challenge, but also concerning the application of the statute.
The section 1905 challenge has been raised in three ways, only one of which
has survived. First, submitters claimed that section 1905, although a criminal
statute, provided an implied private cause of action. 49 Some early district court
decisions recognized such a cause of action. 50 Those decisions, however, were
later rejected, s5 and Chrysler clearly held that no private right of action exists
review standards were again avoided because the action was brought in the form of a declaratory
judgment. The court held that a trial de nova was proper under the Declaratory Judgement Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976), as this review was not one of agency action under the APA, 553 F.2d at
1381. This decision has also been subject to criticism. The Third Circuit recognized that "Itlo
construe the Declaratory Judgment Act to permit a federal court to conduct a trial de novo in
reverse FOIA cases would transfer primary decisional responsibility for agency disclosure from
the administrative agencies to the federal courts" and render the APA ineffective, Chrysler Corp.
v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1127, 1191 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
46. See, e.g., Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976); Civil RightsAct of 1964, Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976); Federal Reports Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3508 (1976).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976). The statute provides: "Whoever, being an officer or employee of the
United States or of any department or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known
in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of
his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by, or return,
report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof,
which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or
apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits,
losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or permits any
income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or particulars thereof to be seen or
examined by any person except as provided by law; shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office or employment." Id.
49. See Reversing the FOIA, supra note 28, at 752-54. If suing on an implied private cause of
action under § 1905, submitters would be entitled to a trial de nova. Id. at 737, 743.
50. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212, 213 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd and
remanded, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975);see Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633, 636
(E.D. Va. 1975).
51. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1188 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated andremandedsub nom. Chrysler v. Brown,
99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979); Charles River Park"A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 243-44 (M.D. Fla. 1979),
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under section 1905.52 Second, challenges were based on the assumptions that
section 1905 was a statute "specifically exemptting] . . . disclosure"5 3 under
exemption 3 of the FOIA and that disclosure was therefore barred by the FOIA
itself. 5 4 Because itis now settled that the FOIA does not provide a basis for such
an action,5 5 the second approach can no longer stand. Finally, submitters have
challenged an agency decision to disclos e confidential information as a violation
of section 1905's provisions and have sought relief under the APA. 5 6 In Chrysler,
7
because a disclosure
the Supreme Court held that such an action was proper
5 8
which violates section 1905 would be "not in accordance with law" 1 under
5 9
court.
reviewing
the
the APA and could therefore be set aside by
60
As to the existing confusion regarding the scope of review under the APA, the
Chrysler Court only briefly discussed the issue, merely stating that "[die novo
review by the District Court is ordinarily not necessary to decide whether a
" 61
contemplated disclosure runs afoul of § 1905. 1 Although this language is
vague, it appears that de novo review should be limited to those situations
established under the APA. 60 Hence, unless submitters show that an agency's

52. 99 S. Ct. at 1725. The most important factor prompting the Court's determination that no
cause of action exists under § 1905 was that relief was available under the APA. ld
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
54. See Reversing the FOIA, supra note 28, at 755-57.
55. See notes 32, 33 supra and accompanying text.
56. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
57. The Court noted that section 1905 places sufficient substantive limitations on an agency's
discretion to make review under the APA available. 99 S. Ct. at 1726. It also rejected the
government's argument that § 1905 is essentially an "anti-leak" statute, and held that it addresses
formal agency action. Id. at 1716. The government had claimed that § 1905 was inapplicable to
formal agency action because its only purpose was to curtail the disclosure of trade secrets and other
confidential information by government employees.
Under the APA, review is available "except to the extent that... agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). This phrase has been held applicable "where
'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' "Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th
Cong., lstSess. 26(1945). The Chryslercourt noted this language and found that § 1905 provides law
to apply. 99 S. Ct. at 1725-26.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
59. 99 S.Ct. at 1726. Because the Court of Appeals had not reached the issue of whether the
materials in question fell within the scope of section 1905, the Court remanded. Id.
60. See pt. I(B) supra.
61. 99 S. Ct. at 1726.
62. See note 38supra. In Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated
and renunded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979), the Third Circuit developed
a helpful analysis for courts to follow in reviewing reverse FOIA suits under the APA. Courts should
determine whether the release of information contemplated by the agency would violate any
nondisclosure statute or regulation. If so, the release should be enjoined. If no nondisclosure statutes
or regulations are applicable, however, the reviewing court must then determine whether the
disclosure was pursuant to the FOIA's mandate. If disclosure was mandatory, the court must merely
determine "whether the agency applied the proper legal standards for the applicability of the FOIA
exemptions." Id. at 1192. Conversely, if the agency determined that the material was exempt yet
decided to release it, the inquiry is two fold. Not only must the reviewing court consider whether the
agency applied the proper legal standards for the applicability of the FOIA exemptions, it must also

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

factfinding procedures are inadequate, a trial de novo would seem improper. 63
In most cases, however, it is the agency record, rather than the factfinding
procedure, which is inadequate because the agency fails to provide the basis
for its decision in its report. It has been generally recognized that the remedy
for an adequate record is not a trial de novo, but a remand to the agency for
further development of the record or an explanation of its decision. 64 Thus it
appears that de novo review will normally not be available to submitters in
reverse FOIA litigation.
In light of Chrysler, the viability of the "threshold determination" approach
adopted in Charles River Park65 must be questioned. Critics of this approach
have asserted that the mere determination that information is exempt does not
compel the conclusion that submitters could bar agency disclosure because the
agency has discretion as to material within an exemption. 66 By finding, specifically, that the FOIA exemptions are in fact permissive, Chrysler has added
impetus to this argument.
In addition to the problems encountered in determining the proper method
for raising a section 1905 challenge, difficulties also arise concerning the
application of the statute. This difficulty is due in part to the language of
section 1905 because it bars only those disclosures not "authorized by law."
Hence, when a reverse FOIA suit is based on section 1905, it becomes
essential to determine what constitutes the authorization of law necessary to
allow disclosure. In cases where the section 1905 material does not also fall
within one of the FOIA exemptions the determination is relatively simple.
That is, if material covered by the FOIA is not exempted from the statute's
mandatory disclosure requirement, there is general agreement that the FOIA's
mandate to disclose provides the authorization of law. 67 It is in cases in which

the material falls not only within section 1905 but also within one of the FOIA
exemptions that the determination becomes more complex.
Section 1905 material may fall within either or both of two FOIA exemptions. 68 The first possibility is that section 1905 is an exempting statute within
exemption 3 of the FOIA, which provides that the FOIA
determine "whether the agency considered the proper factors in determining that disclosure was
permitted under its own disclosure regulations." Id.
Most agency regulations provide for the release of exempt materials when it is in the public interest.
See note 83 infra. In Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth
Circuit enumerated three additional factors to be considered in determining whether disclosure is
proper: "[1] whether disclosure of this type of detailed information will significantly aid the [agency]
in fulfilling its functions, [2) the harm done to the [submitters] by releasing this information [and] the
harm to the public generally, (3] whether there are alternatives to full disclosure that will provide
[requestors] with adequate knowledge to fully participate in the (agency's] proceedings but at the
same time protect the interests of the [submitters]." Id. at 632.
63. See note 38 supra.
64. Campv. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43(1973);see Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172
(3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub noma. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
65. 519 F.2d 935, 940 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
67. 1978 House Report, supra note 17, at 57; Campbell, supra note 21, at 145; Note, Develop-

ments Under The Freedom ofInformation Act-1976, 1977 Duke L.J. 532, 563 [hereinafter cited as
1976 FOIA Developments].
68. There is a possibility in a limited number of cases that § 1905 materials may fall within
another exemption.
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"does not apply to matters that are.
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute
(other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue,
or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters
69
to be withheld."

It is unclear, and the Supreme Court in Chrysler refused to decide, whether
section 1905 falls within this exemption. 7 0 The great weight of authority, however, especially in light of a 1976 amendment to the exemption limiting its

applicability, is that section 1905 is not to be considered an exemption 3 statute. 7 1
The second possible FOIA exemption under which section 1905 material may
fall is exemption 4. This exemption removes "trade secrets and commercial or
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
70. 99 S. Ct. at 1726 n.49.
71. As originally enacted, exemption 3 provided that the FOIA did not apply to matters that were
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." Pub. L. No. 90-23, § 552(b)(3), 81 Stat. 55
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976)). Courts were not in agreement as to what exactly
constituted an "exemption 3 statute." FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 262 n.6 (1975);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1199 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 924 (1977). Some argued that when Congress spoke of a statute "specifically" exempting
information from disclosure, it did not mean to include § 1905 because of its broad language.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 509 F.2d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robertson v. Butterfield, 498
F.2d 1031, 1033 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nona. FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975);
Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 776 (D.D.C. 1974); M.A. Schapiro & Co.
v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 470 (D.D.C. 1972). Other cases did not address the issue of whether §
1905 specifically bars disclosure. They simply held that the protection of trade secrets and other
confidential information was already provided for in exemption 4 of the FOIA, and that § 1905
could not be read in conjunction with exemption 3 to expand that coverage. Charles River Park
"A', Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v.
Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1200-01 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
In 1975, the Supreme Court in FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975), took a broad view of the
statutes encompassed by exemption 3. Though Robertson dealt with an FAA statute, Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, § 1104, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976), rather than § 1905, the Court stated that the
term "specifically" did not require that a statute specify documents by name or category. 422 U.S. at
265. Rather, the Court found that the purpose of exemption 3 was to preserve the viability of
confidentiality statutes. Id. at 266-67. Relying on the Robertson decision, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that § 1905 fell within the provisions of exemption 3. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1201-02 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977).
Congress specifically overruledRobertsonby amending exemption 3 in 1976. H.R. Rep. No. 144 1,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976). Under the amended version, set out in the text, the statutes to be
included within exemption 3 are more limited. Also, the legislative history to the amendment of
exemption 3 indicates that § 1905 was not to be considered within that exemption. H.R. Rep. No.
880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976), reprinted in [19761 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2183,
2205. See generally Note, The Effect of the 1976 Amendment to Exemption Three of the Freedom
ofInformation Act, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1029 (1976). Based upon these factors, it is now generally
agreed that § 1905 is not a statute "specifically exempting disclosure" within the meaning of
exemption 3. Westchester Gen. Hosp. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 240-43 (M.D. Fla. 1979); St.
Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 462 F. Supp. 315, 317 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 158 n.15 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977);
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 744, 752-53 (D. Md. 1976); 1978 House
Report, supra note 17, at 58 n.211; 1976 FOIA Developments, supra note 67, at 563. But see
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378, 1383-85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826
(1977); Campbell, supra note 21, at 145-54; Connolly & Fox, supra note 31, at 228-29.
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financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" 72
from the mandatory disclosure provisions of the FOIA. Due to the "lack of
specificity in the language" 73 of this exemption and the variety of materials
submitted to government agencies, it has been difficult to determine what exactly
is covered by exemption 4. In National Parks and ConservationAssociation v.
Morton, 74 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia formulated a

two-part test:
[C]ommercial or financial matter is 'confidential' for purposes of [exemption 4] if disclosure of the information is likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to impair tile
Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause
substantial harm
75 to the competitive position of the person from whom the information
was obtained.
Although this test has provided courts with a general measure for exemption 4
material,7 6 the final determination is dependent upon the facts of the specific
case.

77

Parties seeking to block disclosure of information have asserted that to the
extent section 1905 material satisfies the criteria for exemption 4, that information is exempt from mandatory disclosure provisions of the FOIA. 78 In the past,
many courts found the scope of the two provisions to be the same. 79 Although
Chryslerdid not rule on the "relative ambits of Exemption 4 and § 1905"0 the
Court noted the similarity in the language of the two provisions."'
Once it is established that section 1905 information is exempt from mandatory
disclosure, it is no longer clear what can provide the authorization of law needed
to allow disclosure of the materials. Courts often relied8 2 on agency regulations
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). The majority of reverse FOIA suits deal with commercial
information rather than actual trade secrets. 1978 House Report, supra note 17, at 7, 15.
73. Clement, supra note 11, at 594 n.24.
498 F.2d 765, (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 770 (footnote omitted).
76. The National Parks test has generally been used in making the determination. See, e.g.,
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1207 n.55 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 924 (1977); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUI), 519 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Westchester Gen. Hosp. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 245 (M.D. Fla. 1979). But see Corporate Dilemma, supra note 16, at 101. See generally Business Record Exemption of the Freedom
of Information Act: HearingsBefore a Subcommittee ofthe Committee on Government Operations,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Comment, A Review of the Fourth Exemption Of The Freedom Of
Information Act, 9 Akron L. Rev. 673 (1976).
1978 House Report, supra note 17, at 2.
77.
78. Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 238 (M.D. Fla. 1979); see
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1204-08 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 924 (1977); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941-42 (D.C. Cir, 1975);
Campbell, supra note 21, at 150.
79. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1204 n.38 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 434 F. Supp. 435, 439 (M.D.
Fla. 1977), preliminary injunction dissolved, 464 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Clement, supra
note 11, at 605; CorporateDilemma, supranote 16, at 102-03. But see Westchester Gen. Hosp. Inc. v.
HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 245-48, 251 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
80. 99 S. Ct. at 1726 n.49.
Id.
81.
82. Sears, Roebuck& Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1200(7th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded
74.
75.

1979]

REVERSE FOIA

which specifically authorized release of materials exempted from the FOIA. 83 It
has been argued, however, that those regulations were not sufficient authorization of law to satisfy that requirement of section 1905.81 Chrysler held that
"authorized by law" in section 1905 has no special limited meaning and an
agency regulation can provide the necessary authorization; 85 however, in order
for a regulation to have the "force and effect of law" necessary to authorize the
disclosure of section 1905 materials, it must satisfy a high standard of review.
Chryslerindicated that such regulations "must have certain substantive
characi '8 6
teristics and be the product of certain procedural requisites.
The regulation must, at a minimum, be substantive. 87 The APA requires that,
before the promulgation of substantive regulations, interested parties be given
notice of, and an opportunity to participate in, the proposed rulemaking.8 8
Failure to comply with these prerequisites will render the regulation ineffective
as a mechanism to release section 1905 material. 89 Hence, after Chrysler, if a
reviewing court finds that these procedural requisites were not met in the
promulgation of the regulation in question, the inquiry should end there. The
regulation cannot provide the authority to release section 1905 materials.
There is a more important inquiry required of a reviewing court. It must
examine the nature of and legislative authorization for such a regulation. The
Supreme Court in Chrysler described a substantive rule "as one 'affecting individual rights and obligations.' "90 It also indicated that a disclosure regulation
satisfies this requirement because it "governs] the public's right to information
sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979); General Dynamics Corp. v.
Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217(8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2024(1979); Chr)sler
Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1186-87 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated arid remanded sub nom.
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 555 F.2d 82, 94
(3d Cir. 1977); Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 251 tM.D. Fla. 1979);
Guerrav. Guajardo, 466 F. Supp. 1046, 1057-58 (S.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd mem., 597 F.2d 769 (5th Cir.
1979). But see Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
83. The regulation specifically at issue in the Chryslerlitigation was promulgated by the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Program. It provides that "[u]pon the request of any person for
identifiable records obtained or generated pursuant to Executive Order 11246 (as amended) such
records shall be made available for inspection and copying, notwithstanding the applicabilityof
the exemption from mandatory disclosure set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552 subsection (b), if it is
determined that the requested inspection or copying furthers the public interest and does not
impede any of the functions of the OFCCP or the Compliance Agencies except in the case of
records disclosure of which is prohibited by law." 41 C.F.R. § 60-40.2(a) (1979) (emphasis
added). Other federal agencies have promulgated similar regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 16.1(a)
(1979) (Dep't of Justice); 29 C.F.R. § 70.11(b) (1978) (Dep't of Labor); 24 C.F.R. § 15.21 t1979)
(Dep't of HUD);.49 C.F.R. § 7.61 (1978) (Dep't of Transp.); 32 C.F.R. § 286.4(b) (1979) (Dep't of
Defense); 10 C.F.R. § 9.9 (1979) (NRC); 21 C.F.R. § 20.82(a) (1978) (FDA); 14 C.F.R. § 310.3(b)
(1979) (CAB)); 41 C.F.R. § 105-60.104-2 (1979) (GSA); 16 C.F.R. § 1015.15(b) (1979) (Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n).
84. See cases cited note 82 supra (submitters challenged sufficiency of agency regulations).
85. 99 S. Ct. at 1714-17.
86. Id. at 1717.
87. Id. at 1717-18; see note 90 infra and accompanying text.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
89. 99 S. Ct. at 1724; Id. at 1727 n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring).
90. 99 S. Ct. at 1718 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974)).
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[and] the confidentiality rights of those who submit information".... 91 Although
this characteristic is an "important touchstone" for determining whether regulations have the force and effect of law, it alone is not sufficient. 92 The more
important question is whether there is a "nexus between the regulations and some
delegation of the requisite legislative authority by Congress. '93 It is apparent,
therefore, that even though a disclosure regulation-"substantive" in nature-is
enacted in accordance with the procedural requirements of the APA, it cannot
provide the authority to release section 1905 materials unless this legislative
nexus is established.
One theory for establishing this legislative nexus had been that the overall
disclosure mandate pervading the FOIA is sufficient to empower federal agencies under that statute to promulgate regulations authorizing disclosure of materials falling within an exemption. 94 The majority of courts, including the Supreme Court in Chrysler, however, rejected this theory, reasoning that because
the FOIA states that it "does not apply to matters that are"' 95 within
an exemp96
tion, it cannot supply the authorization for the regulations,
Other sources identified for this authorization were the enabling acts of federal
agencies, 97 and, in cases involving government contractors, Executive Order No.
11246.98 The enabling acts of federal agencies were not addressed in Chrysler;
however, the Court found that Executive Order No. 11246 does not supply the
requisite authorization of law. Section 201 of that Order empowers the Secretary
of Labor to "adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as he deems
necessary and appropriate to achieve the purposes thereof." 99 Several statutes
were cited as the congressional authority for the Order. 100 The Court, however,
without deciding which statute specifically supplied the authority, held that it
was clear that when Congress enacted these statutes it was not concerned with
the public disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential materials' 0 ' and
that, therefore, the regulation lacked the required nexus.
Many courts and commentators had found that 5 U.S.C. § 301, the "housekeeping" statute, could supply the authorization. This statute empowers an
agency to prescribe regulations for "the distribution and performance of its
business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and
property. " 0 2 The Courts of Appeals for the Third, 0 3 Seventh, 0 4 and Eighth05
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1719.

94. Campbell, supra note 21, at 145, 150-51.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
96. 99 S. Ct. at 1718-19; Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942 & n.8 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
97. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 555 F.2d 82, 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1977); see Campbell, supra
note 21, at 154; Clement, supra note 11, at 623.
98. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1200 n.8 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated and
remanded sub noma.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 99 S. Ct. 2024; see Clement, supra note 11, at
623-24.
99. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340 (1964-1965 Compilation).
100. 99 S. Ct. at 1719-20.
101. Id. at 1720.
102. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
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Circuits adopted this view and held that validly enacted agency regulations
promulgated under section 301 had the force and effect of law and therefore
disclosure pursuant to them was authorization of law within the meaning of
section 1905. The D.C. Circuit, however, rejected this contention,' 0 6 stating
that "Rtio interpret '1section
301 in that way would be inconsistent with (itsi
07
legislative history.
In Chrysler it was argued that the legislative authority for the disclosure
regulation involved could be supplied by section 301. After examining the
legislative history of the statute and recognizing its housekeeping nature, however, the Court rejected the majority interpretation and held that section 301
does not authorize regulations which would permit the release of section 1905
materials. 10 8
1"[.REVERSE FOIA SUITs-A PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS

Although the Supreme Court in Chrysler eliminated the use of both FOIA and
section 1905 as independent grounds upon which to base a reverse FOIA suit, it
did recognize the need for some "balancing and accommodation" of the privacy
interests of submitters.'0 9 The Court hoped to achieve this balance by proposing
a method whereby section 1905 could be used in conjunction with the APA to
block the release of requested information. In the wake of the Chryslerdecision,
two important issues will have to be considered in order to determine if this
method provides submitters with a viable basis for a reverse-FOIA suit. Courts
will now have to determine the scope of section 1905 and its relation to the FOIA
and its exemptions, and what constitutes the authorization of law needed to
allow disclosure of section 1905 information. The degree of protection which
submitters will have in the post-Chrysler era will depend on the positions courts
adopt on each of these issues.
A.

The Scope of Section 1905
The scope of section 1905-the range of commercial information which falls
within its provisions-' 10 will be an important factor in determining the protec103. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1186-87 (3d Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
104. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979).
105. General Dynamics Corp. v. Marshall, 572 F.2d 1211, 1217 n.6(SthCir. 1978),vacated and
remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979).
106. Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942-43 (D.C.Cir. 1975).
107. Id. at 942.
108. 99 S. Ct. at 1722-23.
109. Id. at 1713.
110. For the purposes ofthis Note "scope of § 1905" refers to the material which is initially within
the ambits of the statute. This scope includes that information which may later be released because
disclosure is "authorized by law." In this manner the scope of exemption 4 can be compared with that
of § 1905 in terms of their breadth. This distinction of scope is adopted for analytical purposes and to
avoid confusion in the use of the term. This confusion is reflected in Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v,
HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Fla. 1979), where the court criticized previous decisions which had
equated the scope of § 1905 with that of exemption 4. This criticism was not based on an evaluation of
the ambits of the coverage of these two provisions. Rather, the court concluded that § 1905
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ion available to submitters. A narrow interpretation of this scope would afford
them little protection and would leave agencies with wide discretion to release
information. III This interpretation could cause submitters competitive harm. A
broad interpretation, however, could possibly bar the release of a great amount
of commercial information, a result which would seem to conflict with the
"general philosophy of full agency disclosure" ' 12 embodied in the FOIA.
The language of section 1905 is broad" 3 and it has been recognized that a
literal interpretation of the statute would encompass "virtually every category of
business information likely to be in the files of any federal agency."' 14 Certainly,
almost all the information contained in the various forms and reports submitted
by government contractors' Is "concerns or relates to the ... operations [or] style
of work [of a] corporation" 1 6 and its disclosure would violate section 1905 under
this interpretation. Nevertheless, courts have generally adopted this broad view
because there was never a need to fully analyze the scope of section 1905. Prior to
Chrysler, disclosure pursuant to validly enacted agency regulations was usually
held to be authorization of law within the meaning of section 1905. 11 7Hence, any
materials that fell within the ambits of that section could be released pursuant to
agency regulations and no inquiry as to the scope of the statute was necessary.
Because Chrysler restricts the availability of agency regulations to provide this
authorization of law, 1 1 8 it is evident that section 1905 can no longer be so easily
set aside and inquiry into its proper scope is imperative.
In a number of cases the scope of section 1905 has been equated with that
of exemption 4.119 There is no doubt that the similarity of the language of
these two provisions supports this equation;' 20 however, if section 1905 is
interpreted as having the same scope as exemption 4, the exemption in effect
becomes completely non-permissive in the sense that information within that
scope cannot be disclosed unless "authorized by law" pursuant to section
1905. 121 Although this consequence is not novel, the availability of authorizahad a narrower scope than exemption 4 because disclosures authorized by law limited the scope of §
1905. Id. at 245-51.
111.

A submitter would still be able to challenge an agency's decision to release information

under the APA as improper pursuant to the agency's regulations. See note 62 supra. It appears,
however, that the agency retains much more discretion over the disclosure of exempt materials In the
absence of a nondisclosure statute or one narrowly construed. Id.
112. 1965 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3.
113. See note 48 supra.
114. Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1186 (3d Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
115. See note 14 supra.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
117. See cases cited note 82 supra.
118. See pt. 11(B) infra.
119. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
120. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
121. Although unlikely to occur, if the scope of § 1905 is interpreted more broadly than that of
exemption 4, the discretion of agencies to release commercial materials would be further curtailed. In
that situation, § 1905 would not only render exemption 4 completely nonpermissive, but would also
prevent the disclosure of material beyond exemption 4's coverage unless such disclosure is authorized
by law. In the case of materials beyond the scope of exemption 4 but within that of the FOIA it
appears that the FOIA itself would provide the authorization of law required for the release of
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tion of law has been greatly curtailed by Chrysler, and courts will no longer
be able to allow disclosure of exempt material on the strength of the FOIA
itself, section 301, or Executive Order 11246.122 Furthermore, when Congress
enacted the FOIA, it provided for the protection of trade secrets and
confidential information in the fourth exemption of the statute. These exemptions, as the Chrysler Court recognized, were intended to be permissive.
Agencies have been left with the discretion to release information when, after
having considered the appropriate factors, they deem such disclosure to be
proper. A broad reading of the scope of section 1905 directly contradicts the
notion that the FOIA exemptions are intended to be permissive. Courts,
therefore, should be wary of adopting such a view.
A narrow interpretation of the scope of section 1905 appears to be the
correct one. Section 1905 is a criminal statute and should therefore be
narrowly construed.1 23 Further, it has been argued that because section 1905
is a consolidation of three non-disclosure statutes which were narrow in scope,
despite its broad language, rules of statutory construction dictate that section
1905 be interpreted as no broader than the original statutes. '2- 4 In addition,
this interpretation avoids undermining the philosophy of full disclosure implicit in the FOIA.
§ 1905 materials. If § 1905, however, were an exempting statute within exemption 3, then all §
1905 material, including that beyond exemption 4, would be exempt and the FOIA, or regulations
promulgated thereunder, could not authorize the disclosure.
122. See notes 96, 101, 108 supra and accompanying text.
123.

Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975); 1978 House

Report, supra note 17, at 58.
It is important to note that the District of Columbia Circuit stood alone in its holding that §
301, the "housekeeping" statute, does not authorize the release of § 1905 materials. 519 F.2d at
942. Hence, it was imperative there to instruct the lower court to construe § 1905 narrowly. Id. at
943. Nevertheless, this opinion has been cited for the proposition that the scope of § 1905 and
exemption 4 are the same. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190,
1204 n.38 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); Clement, supra note 11, at 605 n.79;
CorporateDilemma, supra note 16, at 103 n.52. But see Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW,
464 F. Supp. 236, 247-48 (M.D. Fla. 1979). Reference has specifically been made to footnote 7 of
the Charles Park opinion. 519 F.2d at 941-42 n.7. In that footnote, however, the court was
merely saying that examption 3 could not incorporate § 1905 so as to make the coverage for trade
secrets and confidential material broader than exemption 4. When the court addressed the scope
of § 1905 in the text of the opinion, it cautioned that "section 1905 is a criminal statute and should
be narrowly construed." Id. at 943; see Clement, supra note 11, at 613 n. 11 (indicating that the
circuit court amended its opinion to provide for this narrower interpretation).
124. Section 1905 is a consolidation of three early nondisclosure statutes, one involving income
tax, Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 38, 13 Stat. 223, another involving the Tariff Commission,
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 708, 39 Stat. 756, 19 U.S.C. § 1335 (1940) (original version), and one
involving the Department of Commerce, Act of Jan. 27, 1938, ch. 11, 52 Stat, 8, 15 U.S.C. 176a
(1940) (original version). It has been asserted that because the scope of these statutes was narrow,
according to rules of statutory construction, § 1905 should be construed as no broader than the three
original statutes. Clement, supra note 11, at 602-13; see Cavanagh, The Freedom of InformationAct
and Government Contractors-Problemsin Protectionof Confidential Information, 2 Pub. Cont. L.J.
225, 234-35 (1969). This argument was made to the circuit court in Chysler. The court stated,
however, that its decision that § 301 authorized the release of § 1905 materials "precludledi
consideration of that contention." Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1187 n.73 (3d Cir.
1977), vacated and remanded sub nora. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 99 S. Ct. 1905 (1979).
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Both these factors were considered in a House Report on reverse FOIA
suits. The Committee on Government Operations concluded that "although
the language of [section 1905] implies that broad categories of disclosures are
prohibited, only a few are actually covered ....
[T]he scope of section 1905 is
extremely limited, and the section has no relevance to most reverse-FOIA
cases." 125 In addition, when Congress enacted the FOIA it took into account
the necessity of balancing the opposing interests of disclosure and confidentiality. 1 26 This is a delicate balance, and, although it is not always achieved, it
should not be completely upset by the incorrect interpretation of one statute.
B. Authorization of Law
Whether a disclosure is "authorized by law" within the meaning of section
1905 remains a critical issue after Chrysler. With the elimination of the FOIA,
section 301, and Executive Order 11246 as possible bases for the promulgation of regulations authorizing the release of exempt materials, the utility of
section 1905 as a device to bar disclosure may have been increased. Agency
regulations will no longer be accorded the deference they were given by some
courts in the pre-Chrysler era.127 The mere fact that the regulation was
validly enacted would not be sufficient to support the proposition that
disclosure of section 1905 materials is authorized by that regulation. 228 There
must, instead, be a close relationship
between the regulation and the underly29
ing legislative authority.'
It is unclear just how close this relationship must be. The Chrysler Court
does seem to make clear, however, that the mere fact that a statute implies
some authority to collect information does not mean it is a grant of legislative
authority to disclose that information to the public.' 30 In view of the number
of regulations and agencies involved, this determination will have to be made
on a case by case basis depending upon the particular agency, regulation and
statute involved.
It will be incumbent upon the agency, however, to establish this nexus, a
task which may prove of particular difficulty for the government in cases
involving government contracts-a frequent source of reverse FOIA suits.
Because the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs has no statutory
enabling act, unless there is legislative action, section 1905 may prove an
insurmountable barrier in these cases. This barrier will be even greater if
courts fail to construe section 1905 narrowly. It is precisely this result that
courts had sought to avoid in holding that regulations promulgated under
section 301 could authorize the release of section 1905 material. Courts
reasoned that "requiring independent statutory authorization would impose a
125.

1978 House Report, supra note 17, at 58.

126. See notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
127. See cases cited note 82 supra.
128. Chrysler indicates that the inquiry into the validity of a regulation as provided for under the
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c) (1976), is different from the inquiry to determine whether the
regulation provides the authorization of law required by § 1905. 99 S. Ct. at 1722 n.40; ld. at 1727
(Marshall, J., concurring).
129. See notes 90-108 supra and accompanying text.
130. 99 S. Ct. at 1720.

1979]

REVERSE FOIA

Herculean task upon Congress [because it] would have to review, consider,
and enact specific statutes to cover, all of the 13numerous
kinds of business
1
information contained in federal agency files."
Meeting the legislative nexus requirement may not be as difficult in the case
of other reverse FOIA suits based upon different regulations and statutes.
One such example is litigation involving cost reports submitted by hospitals
and other "providers of services" to Blue Cross in order to obtain Medicare
reimbursements. 132 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has
promulgated regulations authorizing the release of such materials.1 33 Section
1106 of the Social Security Act 34 has been identified as the legislative
authority for the promulgation of these regulations. This section, which
specifically provides for the disclosure of information pursuant to regulations, 13s has recently been held to satisfy the legislative nexus requirement of
Chrysler.136 Courts have noted that section 1106 is "specifically concerned
with the disclosure of information pertaining to a discrete subject matter, and
by its very terms contemplates
the issuance of substantive regulations permit137
ting such disclosure."'
It is unclear whether other enabling legislation of various federal agencies
will satisfy the nexus requirement. Some enabling statutes, such as that of the
Federal Trade Commission,' 38 have specific provisions for the dissemination
131. Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236, 250 (M.D. Fla 1979) (citation
omitted); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978). vacated and
remanded sub nor. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dahm, 99 S. Ct. 2024 (1979).
132. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395g (1976) and regulations promulgated at 42 C.F-R. §
405.406(b) (1977) (formerly codified at 20 C.F.R. § 405.406(b)), providers of services are required to
file annual cost reports with the Secretary of HEW or fiscal intermediaries in order to obtain
reimbursement for Medicare services provided.
133. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 422.435(c) (1979).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976).
135. "No disclosure of... any file, record, report or other paper, or any information, obtained at
any time by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, . . . or by any officer or employee of
[HEW] in the course of discharging their respective duties under this chapter. and no disclosure of
any such file, record, report or other paper, or information, obtained at any time by any person from
[HEW] or from any officer or employee of [HEW] shall be made except as the [HE ll"SecretaryInsay
by regulation prescribe .... ." 42 U.S.C. 1306(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
136. Cedars Nursing& Convalescent Ctr. v. AetnaLife&Cas. Ins. Co.,472 F Supp. 296(E.D.
Pa. 1979); BrookwoodMedical Ctr., Inc. v. Califano, 470 F,Supp. 1247 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. HEW, 464 F. Supp. 236 (M.D. Fla. 1979), was decided before Chrjsler.
Although the court was incorrect when it stated that it must determine whether the regulations were
valid under the APA, see note 128 supra, it did identify § 1106, 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976), as the
statutory authority for the regulation. 464 F. Supp. at 253-54. The court also conducted a lengthy
analysisof the legislative history of§ 1106 and the regulations promulgated thereunder Id.at253-57
137. Cedars Nursing & Convalescent Ctr. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 472 F Supp. 296, 298
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Brookwood Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Califano, 470 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 (N-D Ga.
1979). The procedural requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) were also satisfied in the promulgation
of these disclosure regulations. Notice was given, 40 Fed. Reg. 17,849, 17,852 (Apr. 23. 1975), and
comments were received, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,648 (July 1, 1975). Westchester Gen, Hosp., Inc. v HEW,
464 F. Supp. 236, 257 (M.D. Fla. 1979);see Brookwood Medical Ctr . Inc. v.Califano, 470 F Supp.
1247, 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
138. The disclosure provision of the Federal Trade Commission's enabling statute provides that
the Commission shall have power "Itlo make public from time to time such portions of the informa-
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of information to the public. Such a provision should satisfy the nexus
requirement. When the enabling legislation, however, merely provides authorization for an agency to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to
carry out its purposes, 139 the nexus may not be so easily established. Such
statutes are not directives to disclose information. Chrysler, however, does not
require specificity in the underlying legislative authority. 140 Furthermore,
these statutes do not suffer from the inadequacies which plagued section 301
and Executive Order No. 11246.141 They are not internal housekeeping
statutes and are not far removed from congressional authorization in that they
are direct congressional authority to carry out agency functions. Hence, an
enabling statute of this type may provide the nexus which would allow a
reviewing court to "reasonably . . . conclude that the grant of authority
contemplates the regulations issued.' 42 If Chrysler is interpreted as requiring
a "disclosure" nexus, however, this type of legislation would probably be
inadequate.
It is obvious, therefore, that the effect of section 1905 as a bar to disclosure
will differ depending on the agency regulation involved. In light of Chrysler,
however, all of these regulations will be subject to closer judicial scrutiny.
CONCLUSION

One decision cannot unravel an area of law so riddled by uncertainties and
in need of legislative action as that involving reverse FOIA suits. The
Supreme Court in Chrysler has limited the bases for these actions and, in so
doing, has lessened the confusion surrounding this type of litigation. At the
same time, this decision has raised new issues to be confronted and problems
to be resolved. The importance of section 1905 in reverse FOIA litigation has
been greatly increased by the Chrysler decision. Only if the scope of section
1905 is interpreted narrowly by the courts can the intent of Congress
embodied in the FOIA to promote full disclosure be preserved.
Stephen F. Hehl
tion obtained by it hereunder, except trade secrets and names of customers, as it shall deem expedient
in the public interest.. . and to provide for the publication of its reports and decisions in such it form
and manner as may be best adapted for public information and use." 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976).
139. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2201(p) (1976). In a pre-Chryster case, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
NRC, 555 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1977), the Third Circuit held that disclosure regulations promulgated
pursuant to such a "general rulemaking authority" provision, id. at 89, authorized the release of §
1905 materials. See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
140. 99 S. Ct. at 1721.
141. See notes 99-108 supra and accompanying text.
142. 99 S. Ct. at 1721.

